Donald Trump’s much-anticipated address from the White House early on Thursday (India time) was, in the end, a speech delivered by an American President on the backfoot. He did not declare an end to the Iran war — not that such a declaration by Trump would have ended the war. He also did not, to the relief of the Europeans, announce an exit from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato). The speech, instead, was an exercise in trying to provide reassurance — to jittery financial markets, an American public uneasy with the war, rattled global energy markets, uneasy allies, and Gulf States unhappy about being dragged into a war that is not theirs. However, Trump’s attempt was, by any measure, futile.
Thirty-three days in, the war in Iran is not going well for anyone, including Trump. He told Americans they are “very close” to achieving the strategic objectives behind the war — around two to three weeks away, he said. Iran’s navy is gone, its air force “in ruins,” its leaders dead, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps “is being decimated as we speak”, he claimed. And yet Tehran has not fallen. The Islamic Republic has absorbed devastating strikes but continues to fight. It has gone after its neighbours hosting American military, attacked Israel, and, perhaps most consequentially, taken control of the Strait of Hormuz. The regime is not falling like a house of cards, as Trump might have expected, still flush from his cheap win in Venezuela.
Trump claimed that regime change in Iran was never his objective, but the regime has effectively changed, he added, because the old leadership is gone and the new one is more moderate. Not only is this not accurate, but it raises a question Trump has not answered: Who controls Iran’s nuclear programme now and what is its current status? If the objective of this war was to halt Iran’s race to nuclear weapons capability, as he repeatedly claimed in the speech, decapitating its leadership may have created a command ambiguity that makes proliferation more likely, not less. A leadership that is isolated, humiliated, and desperate to prove its mettle is not a leadership that is likely to play it safe. Trump’s Iran war may have created more problems than it has solved.
In some ways, this fits a general American pattern. Consider this: Iraq did not end as Washington intended and Afghanistan ended in a dishonourable rout for the US. Venezuela amounted to little more than an extrajudicial abduction or at best a cheap win. Now Iran, after over a month of intensive bombardment, is still in the fight. While it is clear that American military power can inflict enormous damage, it is increasingly unable to convert such damage into political outcomes. Allies and adversaries are both taking note.
The most telling feature of this war has been the restraint of the Gulf States who have spent decades on the receiving end of Iranian pressure, proxies, and threats. They have every reason to want Iran weakened. And yet they have declined to join this war in any decisive manner. That is experience, or a smart reading of the American strategy over the past quarter century, at the least. They have watched the US come in, disrupt, and leave, time and again, and they have been the ones to pick up the pieces after the war machine leaves the battlefield in a hurry. The lesson drawn by the Gulf seems to be this: Israel will be the ultimate beneficiary of any Iranian collapse, the Americans will eventually leave, and they will be left to manage the aftermath. So, stay away as much as possible. Perhaps Trump’s most consequential statement on Wednesday was not about Iran, but about Hormuz. “We don’t need oil from Hormuz,” he said. “Those who need it must protect it.” Blunt, transactional, and very Trump-like, but with enormous implications.
The Strait of Hormuz is the passage through which roughly 25% of the world’s oil flows. Iran has used it as leverage throughout this conflict — and Trump’s response is to walk away from any American responsibility to keep it open even though his actions caused its closure in the first place. This is the Trump doctrine in its most unadulterated form: The US will protect its own interests, and everyone else must fend for themselves.
Trump’s speech touched on something even bigger. The collective security architecture that has underpinned seven decades of “relative” global stability which was built around American power, multilateral institutions, and security guarantees, is clearly coming apart. The UN has already been marginalised, with the Security Council in deep paralysis. Nato’s future remains deeply uncertain despite no announcement on Thursday of an American withdrawal that Trump had threatened a few days ago. The trust deficit in American leadership is at a historic low, not just in Europe but across East Asia and the Gulf. The costs of Trump’s global misadventures will fall hardest on those most dependent on the old, dying, global order — American allies in particular.
For India, which is not an American ally, the impact of the Trump doctrine is somewhat immediate and proximate. Approximately 80% of India’s energy imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. If the US continues to torpedo regional stability in South and West Asia, New Delhi will have to rethink its broader grand strategy.
In particular, it will need to stop viewing Washington as a forever security partner. While Washington still remains an opportunity that New Delhi can’t afford to avoid, its unpredictable regional engagement is fast becoming a persistent structural problem India can’t ignore. It is becoming harder by the day for New Delhi to tell the opportunity from the problem. And harder still, perhaps, to know which demands how much attention.
Happymon Jacob is distinguished visiting professor, School of Humanities & Social Sciences, Shiv Nadar University, and editor, INDIA’S WORLD magazine. The views expressed are personal
