“They said, something unusual is happening. There are eight boats that are going right up the middle of the Hormuz strait … I think they were Pakistani flagged … I guess we’re dealing with the right people [in Iran]”, US president Donald Trump disclosed in a recent cabinet meeting. In total, 10 Pakistani flagged oil tankers recently crossed the Strait of Hormuz. They were allegedly a “present” from Iran to Trump and signalled intent to pursue negotiations with Islamabad as a “go-between” if not a formal mediator. Just as Pakistan’s role in this war came into sharper focus, its Eid ceasefire with Afghanistan ended and border clashes resumed. This ceasefire had come into effect after Pakistan bombed a drug rehabilitation centre in Kabul that claimed nearly 400 lives.
As India debates the optical and substantive value of its handling of this war till now, the geopolitical plates of its “near west” are undergoing a tectonic shift. The first shift is occurring inside Iran as the war enters the next, deadlier phase of a potential ground incursion by American and Israeli forces. The second is in Kabul, where the Afghan Taliban is undergoing a fitful transformation from being an insurgent group that won a State as a war spoil into a Statist administration.
The final shift is happening in Islamabad, where the military has regained some of its lost popularity and is experiencing a reawakening of its geopolitical purpose. This is despite Pakistan’s persistent economic troubles, a brewing energy crisis, and former prime minister Imran Khan being incarcerated.
Given how consequential they are for India’s interests, these shifts deserve analytical attention beyond the wider dynamics of a disrupted world order, energy market shocks, and the remaking of West Asia. They are also more important than the red herring of India somehow losing out to Pakistan as a potential “go-between”. So huge are the human and economic costs of this war that India should be content with whoever helps bring it to an end. And while there are several ways to interpret the regional changes mentioned here, a keener focus on regime dynamics and choices is most valuable.
In Iran, the first salvoes of the war have clarified two aspects. One, the regime is embattled and compromised, but dispersed and resilient. If this is a fight for its survival, the Iranian regime is aiming to protect three core coercive tools, i.e., its control of the Strait of Hormuz, its arsenal of ballistic missiles and drones, and keeping alive as many middle- to upper-middle level commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as possible. All the rest is negotiable — from the lives and livelihood of Iran’s people, energy infrastructure, and enriched uranium, to even limited territorial loss.
The Iranian regime understands that to come out fighting in this war requires retaining its ability to inflict military, economic, and political pain on its Gulf neighbours, Israel, and the US. If it persists in this, it will be a sufficiently powerful signal to Iran’s proxies in Yemen and Lebanon and partners in Russia and China to increase battlefield support for Tehran. Even in the unlikely scenario where Iran fails to impose such costs, a ground incursion by the US and Israel will offer cause for Russia and China to ensure regime survival. Whatever shape Iran’s regime takes in the future, it will be battle-hardened, brutal, and uncompromising in its domestic and foreign dealings.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban is experiencing a paradoxical reality. Pakistan’s airstrikes are coalescing public opinion in support of the Taliban along anti-Pakistan Afghan nationalist lines. Such sense of crisis cohesion has offered Sirajuddin ‘Siraj’ Haqqani, the interior minister and leader of the erstwhile Haqqani network, an opportunity to build a consociation beyond his base in eastern Afghanistan.
This will strengthen his position in relation to the Kandahar-based faction led by the Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada. But the costs of this opportunity remain high as Pakistan targets the Taliban’s military apparatus along with that of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Baloch Liberation Army.
The last few days have offered a glimpse into Siraj’s attempt to reconcile these pressures. The first is his message at the mass funeral of those killed in the airstrikes. In a speech urging restraint, he clarified that: “Our forces have the ability to face Pakistan, but despite that, we don’t want the issue to end up in a crisis … we should not act out of revenge.” The second are his faltering attempts to get China and Turkey to impress on Pakistan to halt the airstrikes and negotiate again. At the negotiating table, short of handing over Noor Wali Mehsud and other TTP figures, Kabul is considering a range of compromises from disarming the TTP to halting suicide attacks inside Pakistan. Such a compromise comes with the risk of pushback from disgruntled TTP factions, but that may be lesser price to pay compared to Pakistani airstrikes.
Apart from Pakistani pressure, this is also because over the last few years, Kabul has grown unsure of the TTP’s ability to hold territory inside Pakistan. Territorial control has been an operational expectation from Kabul to justify continued sponsorship of the TTP beyond ideological sympathies and battlefield camaraderie.
Whether Siraj can bell the proverbial cat without causing pushback from Kandahar or from defence minister Mullah Yaqoob who said that “Islamabad will be targeted just as they target Kabul” is unclear. But the Taliban’s policy dial on the TTP and long-term relations with Pakistan has begun to shift.
In Pakistan, Field Marshal Asim Munir has honed the skill of playing the hand and not the cards. Ever since the May 2025 conflict with India, India Munir has exploited every crisis to his political benefit. The spate of suicide attacks and insurgent violence has marshalled public opinion behind the army, if not Munir as such. His positioning of Pakistan as peacemaker in the Third Gulf War must be taken seriously. It is driven by genuine concern about severe economic harm and increasing sectarian violence. Even if the effort fails, Pakistan is being viewed as a credible player by the US, the Gulf countries, and Iran alike — credible enough for the Israelis to threaten Pakistan’s embassy in Tehran, and for the Saudis to invoke the joint defence pact. If the latter happens and Pakistan enters the war on the Saudis’ side, Riyadh will ensure that Pakistan’s economy does not falter.
India must rethink the equities it needs to manage these evolving regimes in its ‘near west’. New Delhi must not underestimate Pakistan, overestimate Afghanistan, and mismanage Iran that remains critical to its energy and food security.
Avinash Paliwal teaches at SOAS University of London and is the author of India’s Near East:A New History (London: Hurst, 2024). The views expressed are personal
