Pakistan’s push to host US–Iran peace talks is being shaped as much by urgency as by opportunity. Islamabad is growing increasingly wary that its defence pact with Saudi Arabia could pull it deeper into a widening regional conflict.
Pakistan is set to host a four-nation meeting with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt on March 30 in Islamabad. It is trying to position itself as a mediator between Washington and Tehran, seeking to de-escalate a month-long conflict that threatens regional stability and its own fragile economy. All while trying to avoid being dragged into the war through existing security commitments.
The planned quadrilateral talks are the first since tensions escalated, coming as Pakistan intensifies diplomatic outreach.
It has already relayed a reported 15-point US peace proposal to Iran and offered to host direct negotiations.
But beneath the diplomatic push lies a growing unease within Islamabad’s security establishment.
Pakistan reportedly signed a mutual defence treaty with Saudi Arabia last year, but it is now turning out to be a strategic liability amid the rising hostilities. Recent Iranian strikes on Saudi territory have sharpened fears that Pakistan could be compelled to take sides in a conflict it is keen to avoid.
According to a Financial Times report, Pakistani officials increasingly see the Saudi pact as “becoming a problem”, particularly as deterrence appears to have faltered without delivering the expected economic dividends.
“The Saudi pact is becoming a problem for us,” FT reported, citing a person in Pakistan with an understanding of the thinking of Pakistan’s senior military leaders. “It was supposed to be cash for deterrence. But we’ve not gotten any new Saudi investments, and deterrence failed.”
The risk of entanglement is compounded by Islamabad’s close military ties with Riyadh and its simultaneous efforts to maintain workable relations with Tehran.
This balancing act is further complicated by domestic pressures.
Strong anti-US and anti-Israel sentiment, alongside widespread public sympathy for Iran, especially among Pakistan’s large Shia population, limits the government’s room for manoeuvre. Any overt alignment with Washington or Riyadh risks triggering internal unrest.
“The problem for Islamabad is not simply geo-sectarian, but also rampant anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments in the country that have created popular sympathy for Iran during the conflict,” FT cited Kamran Bokhari, senior resident fellow with the Middle East Policy Council in Washington.
He further added, “The Pakistanis got involved in diplomacy so that they could avoid getting dragged into the fighting.”
At the same time, Pakistan’s leadership sees diplomatic engagement as a strategic necessity. Prolonged conflict in the Gulf threatens energy supplies, trade routes and an already strained economy. Acting as a mediator also bolsters Islamabad’s global relevance and helps shore up domestic legitimacy at a time of political and economic stress.
Pakistan has engaged both the US and Iranian leadership through backchannels, while also coordinating with regional powers, including Turkey and Egypt. The emerging grouping has drawn comparisons to a loose “Islamic NATO”, though officials frame it as a platform for stability rather than a military bloc.
The FT report noted that the longer the conflict drags on, the harder Pakistan’s balancing act becomes. A failed diplomatic effort could erode trust with both Washington and Tehran, leaving Islamabad isolated even as the risk of regional spillover grows.
For now, Pakistan is betting on diplomacy to keep itself out of the line of fire. But with alliances tightening and tensions escalating, its room to manoeuvre may be narrowing rapidly.
