Iran’s missile blitz, Hormuz crisis or…? HT decodes Trump’s sudden change in stance

Against this backdrop, US President Donald Trump has abruptly put diplomacy back on the table – but only for five days, and with US Marines sailing into position even as back-channel envoys quietly shuttle between capitals.

Gupta described “backstabbing diplomacy” already underway, with a rotating cast of interlocutors – Turkey, Egypt and Oman earlier, and now Pakistan emerging as a new go-between seeking relevance with big powers. But is this the correct lens?

According to Gupta, Trump’s turn to diplomacy is driven less by any battlefield setback and more by the economic shock radiating from the Gulf. Pressure continues to mount on Washington as energy costs rise.

Iran has effectively “choked” the Strait of Hormuz and the wider Persian Gulf–Gulf of Oman corridor, selectively allowing ships through only after quiet understandings, often via countries like India or China. With oil and LPG prices climbing and shortages looming, Washington is staring at a serious energy crisis with knock-on effects for the global economy – a pressure point even a hawkish White House cannot ignore, especially when other nations come knocking seeking answers.

Trump has publicly said he is giving diplomacy five days. Gupta points out that those same five days are also the window in which two US amphibious assault ships – USS Tripoli and USS Boxer – with around 5,000 marines will be fully in position around the Gulf of Oman.

That posture, he argues, preserves the option of “boots on the ground” even as Washington brandishes the olive branch. The message from Washington is this: war is the only option left if diplomacy does not work.

Gupta stresses that there is “hardly any sign of the regime collapsing,” and that Tehran has not yet tapped key tools in its arsenal – naval mines and explosive-laden boats among them.

To understand why Iran is not blinking, Gupta urges viewers to look at the country’s political psychology. Those who are now in their late 40s or 50s are the “children of the revolution” of Ayatollah Khomeini – generations steeped in slogans of “death to America, death to Israel” and a martyrdom-centric worldview that glorifies shahadat as the highest achievement.

In his telling, Iran sees itself as a victim and treats sacrifice in conflict as a virtue, not a cost.

This ideological bedrock is reinforced by a hard security apparatus – the IRGC, Quds Force and Basij – and by a regime that Gupta bluntly calls non-democratic and willing to “do the Tiananmen” if faced with mass protests. That combination makes an internal uprising unlikely and suggests Tehran will “continue firing till the time they can fire”.

By contrast, he characterises the United States as a democracy that struggles to stomach “body bags”, prefers standoff weapons and too often believes in painless regime change without understanding the societies it intervenes in, as in Afghanistan.

The result, Gupta predicts, is a grinding pattern: both sides will keep firing, then edge towards negotiation, and the conflict may not end decisively so much as slowly “peter out” after reciprocal concessions.

Gupta says Iran fired two Khorramshahr-class missiles at the base: one failed en route, and the second was intercepted over the central Indian Ocean by a US SM-3 (Standard Missile-3) interceptor.

While many in the West still tend to see Iran’s ballistic capabilities as limited, Indian security assessments cited by Gupta put Iran’s missile reach at up to 4,000 km, bringing parts of Europe, much of India, the southern Indian Ocean and swathes of Africa within range.

Alongside missiles, Iran has invested heavily in long-range drones such as the Shahed-136 and the more advanced Shahed-4. These relatively cheap platforms have proven so effective that both Russia and the United States have reverse-engineered them, even as they often have to be shot down by interceptors costing millions of dollars apiece – bringing in another meaning to the phrase “cost of war”.

This asymmetry, Gupta warns, is central to the “major concern” about Iran: a committed regime with a growing inventory of ballistic missiles and advanced drones, whose full remaining arsenal is unknown, presents a persistent, hard-to-deter threat.

A threat that America and Israel deem necessary to quash as soon as possible, as outlined by pre-emptive strikes.

Gupta notes that such a statement would be based on intelligence assessments, not personal conjecture.

Pakistan is already working on, or has developed, the Ababeel MIRV missile, which can carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, and systems like Shaheen-2, with ranges around 2,700 km. That puts even India’s distant Andaman and Nicobar Islands within reach, reflecting Pakistani fears that Indian missiles could be deployed from there.

With Chinese assistance, Islamabad is also experimenting with warheads from one ton to multiple kilotons, steadily expanding its nuclear options.

Gupta says Pakistan can extend its reach to roughly 4,000 km – the intermediate-range ballistic missile bracket – potentially putting Diego Garcia, parts of Europe and US bases in the Gulf and Central Asia under theoretical threat.

The reason India did not feature in Gabbard’s warning, he suggests, lies in doctrine: India maintains a clear “no first use” nuclear policy, whereas Pakistan has an explicit first-use posture. China also claims “no first use”, though it has not reiterated this in recent years – a sign that alarm bells could be ringing in the future.

New Delhi is, in his framing, an economic victim rather than a combatant, with its primary exposure coming through energy prices and supply security.

India has consistently called for “restraint, peace and dialogue” – as it has over Ukraine – while focusing on securing its oil and gas needs.

Although India maintains open channels with all key players, from Washington and Tehran to the Gulf capitals, Gupta says no one has formally asked New Delhi to intervene or mediate. For now, he believes India’s priority must be safeguarding its own economy rather than inserting itself into a volatile, multi-player war.

Gupta describes a “war theatre” where Indian oil and LPG tankers sit waiting for safe passage amid constant missile and drone fire, their crews so anxious that Indian warships in the Gulf of Oman maintain continuous radio contact to reassure them.

Iran, he says, is deliberately leveraging the Strait of Hormuz and the wider Persian Gulf as an economic weapon to force the US and Israel to negotiate.

Hardly any ships are moving without IRGC clearance, and escorts by foreign warships are not being permitted. Decentralised IRGC units heighten the risk that a rogue commander could decide to fire at any moment.

Brent crude has already spiked as high as $119 a barrel and is hovering around the $100 mark, with Iran promising further escalation via longer-range missiles and drones.

Compounding the crisis, Yemen’s Houthi rebels have threatened to target shipping in the Red Sea and Suez Canal, creating the prospect of a “double band” of disruption that could choke both of West Asia’s vital maritime arteries.

If that happens, Gupta warns, oil prices and all oil-linked costs could soar worldwide, turning Iran’s strategy into full-fledged economic warfare against the US and its partners.

Every Gulf Cooperation Council country has been hit by Iranian missiles or drones, with Tehran justifying its attacks by pointing to their support for the US campaign.

Around 3,500 Iranian projectiles have struck across the Gulf, targeting not just military sites but civilian infrastructure and vital oil facilities in places like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and Iraq.

These economies – which had been focused on development goals from Dubai and Sharjah’s growth to Saudi Arabia’s ambitious diversification plans – now find themselves paying the price for having hosted US bases.

Politically, Gupta believes this will force a reckoning. Gulf capitals will begin to question whether the US remains a reliable security guarantor when they are bearing so much of the cost.

At the same time, he foresees the possibility of Gulf states banding together into a common defensive – and perhaps offensive – front, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to ensure they have their own means of deterrence and retaliation if Iran continues to escalate.

Considering Iran has not backed down yet, this is a likely scenario.

In the end, Gupta’s assessment is of a conflict likely to drag on, shaped by unequal risk appetites, deep ideological convictions and a dangerous entanglement of missiles, markets and maritime chokepoints.

Whether Trump’s five-day diplomatic gamble can meaningfully change that trajectory, he suggests, will depend less on statements in Washington and more on how far Tehran believes it can push the world’s energy lifelines before the costs become unbearable for everyone involved.